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Abstract
With increasing number of antennae in base stations, there is considerable interest in using beam-
forming to improve physical layer security, by creating an ‘exposure region’ that enhances the received
signal quality for a legitimate user and reduces the possibility of leaking information to a randomly
located passive eavesdropper. The paper formalizes this concept by proposing a novel definition for the
security level of such a legitimate transmission, called the ‘Spatial Secrecy Outage Probability’ (SSOP).
By performing a theoretical and numerical analysis, it is shown how the antenna array parameters can
affect the SSOP and its analytic upper bound. Whilst this approach may be applied to any array type
and any fading channel model, it is shown here how the security performance of a uniform linear array
varies in a Rician fading channel by examining the analytic SSOP upper bound.
Keywords
Physical layer security, beamforming, exposure region, spatial secrecy outage probability, uniform
linear array.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the proliferation of wireless communications, there is a strong need to provide improved
level of security at the physical layer to complement conventional encryption techniques in the
September 22, 2016 DRAFT
Page 1 of 35 IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
2
higher layers. Since Wyner established the wiretap channel model and showed the possibility of
approaching Shannon’s perfect secrecy without a secret key [1], this has been since extended to
various channels, such as non-degraded discrete memoryless broadcast channels [2], Gaussian
wiretap channels [3], fading channels [4], [5] and multiple antenna channels [6]–[8].
Wyner’s wiretap channel model requires that the legitimate user should have a better channel
than the adversarial user, even only for a fraction of realizations in fading channels [4]. Different
users’ locations can provide distinction between their channels due to the large-scale path loss
relying on user’s distance to the transmitter. However, the role of location in information-
theoretic security research has been largely ignored, presumably as users are often assumed
to be randomly distributed. With the aid of the stochastic geometry theory, the distribution of
the random users’ locations can be modeled via Poisson point process (PPP), [9], [10] thus
encouraging the utilization of location in wireless security. For example, ArrayTrack [11] shows
how improving granularity can be used to enhance security [12]. In [13]–[15], a location-based
beamformer utilizes user’s location to enhance security, which does not require user’s full channel
state information (CSI).
This paper mainly investigates the security threat posed by a particular adversarial behavior,
i.e., passive eavesdropping, with the classical model where the transmitter (Alice) wishes to
transmit to the legitimate user (Bob) in presence of PPP distributed eavesdroppers (Eves). Alice
is equipped with antenna array and performs beamforming to enlarge the difference between
Bob’s and Eve’s channels. Beamforming has been shown to achieve the secrecy capacity in
multiple-input-single-output (MISO) channels [6], [7] and has provoked a lot of research [16],
[17]. Essentially, it is a spatial filter that focuses energy in a certain direction or suppresses energy
in other directions [18], thereby allowing distinguishing between locations that are either secure
or insecure, for the transmission to Bob. This is important as many applications require security
inside an enclosed area, such as different zones in an exhibition hall or different assembly lines
in a factory.
In this paper, we consider the scenarios that only Bob’s location information is available
at Alice, as explained in [13]–[15]. In our previous work [19], [20], beamforming is used
to create an ‘exposure region’ (ER) to protect the transmission to the legitimate user. However,
the ER in [19], [20] is not based on information-theoretic parameters and lacks the theoretical
analysis. Alternatively, in this paper, the ER is defined by the physical region where any PPP
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distributed Eve causes secrecy outage to the legitimate transmission in a general channel model,
i.e., Rician fading channel. Then, the spatial secrecy outage probability (SSOP) is defined for
the ER based beamforming, which measures the security level of the legitimate transmission
based on the ER; this enables an investigation of the role of the array parameters, e.g. number
of elements and the direction of emission (DoE) angle, on physical layer security.
Related work has attempted to create different sorts of physical regions to combat the random-
ness of both Eve’s location and of the fading channel, e.g., [21]–[23]. Whilst the term ‘exposure
region’ was coined in [21], it referred to received signal quality instead of secrecy outage and
lacked information-theoretic analysis whereas in other work, [22], [23], the antenna array is
overlooked in the information-theoretic analysis. Since beamforming is performed via antenna
arrays, the ER created using beamforming is highly related to the array parameters and can be
controlled by changing the array parameters which in turn, affects the SSOP.
The main contributions of this paper are
• Definition of the new term called SSOP which is based on the ER where randomly located
Eves cause secrecy outage and which measures the security performance in fading channel
from the spatial perspective and links with array parameters; it can be applied to existing
research to provide information-theoretic analysis and enhanced security performance by
taking array parameters into consideration;
• A general expression of the upper bound for the SSOP is obtained to facilitate the
theoretical analysis of the security performance, applicable to any array type and fading
channel model; a closed-from expression of the upper bound for the SSOP is derived for
the uniform linear array (ULA);
• Based on the SSOP, the first investigation of the security performance of ER based
beamforming with ULA in a Rician fading channel with respect to the array parameters
is presented. Numerical results reveals that in general, the SSOP increases dramatically
as Bob’s angle increases; when the number of elements in the array increases, the SSOP
converges to a certain value depending on Bob’s angle. As for the upper bound, the
numerical results show that it is tighter for a smaller number of elements.
The paper is organized as follows. The related work to physical layer security from the physical
region perspective is surveyed in Section II. In Section III, the system model and channel models
are demonstrated whereas in Section IV, the ER is established, based on which the SSOP and its
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analytic upper bound are derived. The SSOP for the ULA and for the Rician channel are analyzed
in Sections V and,VI respectively, along with the tightness of the upper bound. In Section VII,
the conclusions are given.
II. RELATED WORK
Whenever Alice has knowledge of Bob’s CSI or location information, beamforming can be
used to enhance the received signal quality around Bob and reduce the possibility of leaking
information to Eve. As Eve’s CSI and location information are generally unknown to Alice, this
requires the creation of a physical region either based on the traditional performance metrics, e.g.,
received power or signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio [21], [24]–[28], or information-theoretic
parameters, such as secrecy outage probability (SOP) [22], [23], [29]–[31].
In [24], multiple arrays have been used to jointly create a region smaller than that of a single
array by dividing the transmitted message and sending it out via multiple arrays in a time-
division manner, so that only the user within the jointly created region can receive the complete
message. This idea was extended in [21], [25] by encrypting the transmitted message so that
only the user within in the jointly created region could decrypt it, with interference sent on some
arrays to reduce the effective coverage region. Multiple APs were used in [26] to jointly perform
beamforming with adaptive transmit power to reduce the joint physical region.
Whilst multiple arrays provide smaller regions, synchronization of the arrays and modifications
to higher layer protocol are problematic [24]. In [27], the authors avoid this by using a single
array to create a cross-layer design called a STROBE that inserts orthogonal interference which
is transmitted simultaneously with the intended data stream, so that Eve cannot decode correctly
while Bob remains unaffected by the interference. The work in [28] designed a specific type
of smart array that has two synthesized radiation patterns that can alternatively transmit in a
time-division manner overlapping in Bob’s direction to provide a full signal transmission whilst
reducing signal quality to Eve.
The work based on the traditional performance metrics lacks an information-theoretic anal-
ysis, although in [21], [25], the authors define the ER as a performance metric but not using
information-theoretic parameters. Work on insecure and secure regions using the information-
theoretic parameters has been undertaken on the compromised secrecy region (CSR) [22], secrecy
outage region (SOR) [23] and vulnerability region (VR) [29], but defined by the region where
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a certain security goal is not achieved. On the other hand, the secure regions in [30], [31] are
defined by certain security goal being guaranteed. Despite of the difference in the definition of
the physical regions, beamforming and/or artificial noise (AN) are used in the work that is based
on information-theoretical parameters, either in the form of antenna arrays [23], [30], [31] or in
the form of distributed antennas [22], [29].
Most reviewed work provides numerical approximations but not the closed-form formulation
for these physical regions except [23], [31]. The closed-form formulation of the physical region
or its upper bound in this paper can provide analysis with respect to the related aspects, such as
array parameters, which can be potentially used for optimization towards higher level security. In
[23], the Rician fading is averaged and treated as a constant in a very large number of antennas
systems. Rayleigh fading generated from simple expressions is considered in [31], but it is not
practical to obtain Bob’s CSI or location information without the line-of-sight (LOS) component.
It is worth noticing that almost all the reviewed work does not investigate the role of the array
parameters in the physical regions. In [13]–[15], the authors consider some aspect of the array
parameters but do not focus on the analysis of the array parameters.
III. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODELS
Consider secure communications in wireless local access network, e.g., Wi-Fi, where the
access point (AP), Alice, communicates to a desired receiver (Bob) in presence of passive
eavesdroppers (Eves), as shown in Fig. 1. Suppose that the AP is equipped with an ULA having
N antenna elements with a spacing ∆d . In this context, it is the common setting in mobile
devices, i.e., Bob and Eves, to have a single antenna due to physical size limitation. Bob and
Eves are simply referred to as a ‘general user’ or a ‘user’ hereinafter, unless otherwise stated.
In this paper, Eves are assumed to be non-collaborative.
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider that the AP is located at the origin point in polar coordinates
and a user’s coordinates are denoted by z = (d, θ). For ease of mathematical modeling, the
ULA is aligned on Y-axis with the center at the origin point. The user’s angle θ in the
polar coordinates is also the angle to the norm of the ULA. Assume that the users are
distributed by a homogeneous PPP, Φe, with density λe [32]; Bob’s coordinates are denoted by
zB = (dB, θB); the ith Eve’s coordinate is zEi = (dEi, θEi),∀i ∈ N+. The subscripts ‘B’ and ‘E’
are used for Bob and Eves hereinafter.
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AP
Eve3 ),( 33 EEd 
Eve2 ),( 22 EEd 
Eve1 ),( 11 EEd 
Bob ),( BBd 
Fig. 1. An example of a wireless security communications system with one AP, Bob and homogeneous PPP distributed Eves
Given zB, the AP transmits data only towards Bob in the presence of l randomly distributed
Eves in every transmit time interval. In particular, let x be the modulated symbol with unit
power, E[|x|2] = 1, and Pt be its transmit power. The transmitted vector, denoted by u, is given
by u =
√
Ptw
∗x, where w is the beamforming weight vector, i.e., w = s(θ)/
√
N , and s(θ) is
the array steering vector,
s(θ) = [e−jφ1(θ), ..., e−jφi(θ), ..., e−jφN (θ)]T , (1)
where φi(θ) is the phase shift on the i-th element and θ ∈ [0, 2pi]. For the ULA, substituting
φi(θ) = k∆d(i− 1) sin θ into (1), we obtain the array steering vector of the ULA,
s(θ) = [1, ..., e−jk∆d sin θ(i−1), ..., e−jk∆d sin θ(N−1)]T , (2)
where k = 2pi/λ and λ is the wavelength of the carrier signal [33]. For the 2.4 GHz Wi-Fi
signal, λ = 12.5 cm. Note that s(θ) in (1) is a general expression for any type of array,
while (2) is the expression just for the ULA. For example, the expression for a uniform
circular array can be obtained by substituting φi(θ) = kR cos(θ − 2pi(i − 1)/N), where
R is the radius of the circular array. Given Bob’s location information, θ is set to θB, i.e.,
w = s(θB)/
√
N .
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For a general user at z = (d, θ), denoted by h(z), the channel gain vector between the AP
and user at z can be decomposed into LOS and non-LOS (NLOS) components, and is expressed
by
h(z) = d−β/2
(√ K
K + 1
s(θ) +
√
1
K + 1
g
)
, (3)
where d−β/2 denotes the large-scale path loss at the distance, d, and the path loss exponent β ∈
[2, 6]; g = [g1, g2, ..., gN ]T represents the NLOS component where every gi entry is independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian random variable with
zero mean and unit variance, i.e., gi ∼ CN (0, 1); K denotes the factor of the Rician fading.
According to (3), the received signal at z can be obtained by
r(z) = hT (z)u + nW =
√
Pt
dβ
h˜x+ nW , (4)
where nW is the additive white Gaussian noise with zero mean and variance σ2n and h˜ is the
equivalent channel factor, which is given by
h˜ =
(√ K
K + 1
sT (θ) +
√
1
K + 1
gT
)s∗(θB)√
N
=
√
K
K + 1
G(θ, θB) +
√
1
K + 1
gT s∗(θB)√
N
, (5)
where G(θ, θB) is the array factor. Note that G(θ, θB) in (5) is a general expression derived
from (1) and is also valid for any type of array. For the ULA, it is given by
G(θ, θB) =
1√
N
N∑
i=1
ejk∆d(sin θB−sin θ)(i−1)
=
1√
N
1− ejNk∆d(sin θB−sin θ)
1− ejk∆d(sin θB−sin θ) . (6)
Remark 1: The array patterns for G(θ, θB) at ±(θB ±pi) are symmetric to each other. Due to
this symmetry property of the ULA, it suffices to study G(θ, θB) only in θB ∈ [0, pi2 ].
Denoted by γ(z), the received SNR at z, can be found from (4),
γ(z) =
Pt
σ2nd
β
|h˜|2. (7)
The channel capacity of the general user at z can be given by
C(z) = log2[1 + γ(z)] = log2
(
1 +
Pt
σ2nd
β
|h˜|2
)
. (8)
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For convenience, let CB = C(zB) and CEi = C(zEi) denote the channel capacities of Bob
and the i-th Eve hereinafter. Due to the fact that |h˜|2 scales with G(θ, θB), a proper design of
G(θ, θB) can improve CB while decreasing CEi.
IV. EXPOSURE REGION AND SPATIAL SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
From (8), notice that CEi relies on random location zEi and the small-scale fading h˜. As a
result, one or more Eves could have a higher channel capacity than a certain threshold, leading
to the secrecy outage [34]. For given Eves’ random locations, the exposure region (ER) is
mathematically formulated to characterize the above secrecy outage event. Then the SOP with
respect to the ER is evaluated as a measure of the security level. An upper bound expression
for the SSOP is derived to facilitate theoretical analysis.
A. Exposure Region
Let RB and Rs be the rate of the transmitted codewords and the rate of the confidential
information, respectively. As in [34], we assume the following statements. We differentiate
a secrecy outage and a unreliable transmission, i.e., a data outage when CB < RB. In
this paper, we only focus on a secrecy outage event, given that CB ≥ RB. Notice that the
data outage event, given that CB < RB, is the typical outage with no secrecy and thus no
secrecy outage. Accordingly, this data outage is not part of the secrecy outage and is out
of our scope. Secrecy outage event occurs when Eve’s channel capacity is higher than the
difference RB − Rs conditioned on CB ≥ RB, and the probability of such an event is the
SOP.
The geometric meaning is lacking in the above definition of SOP in [34]. To characterize
the secrecy outage event for the PPP distributed Eves, the ER, denoted by Θ, is defined by the
geometric region only where Eves cause the secrecy outage event, i.e., CEi > RB −Rs, ∃zEi =
(d, θ) ∈ Θ. Accordingly, Θ can be represented by
Θ = {z : C(z) > RB −Rs} conditioned on CB ≥ RB. (9)
The i-th Eve will cause secrecy outage, if and only if zEi ∈ Θ. In the same time, CB ≥ RB
needs to be guaranteed.
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Bob
AP
sB RRzC )(
BRzC )(
is the contour of)(D 
Fig. 2. Illustration of the ER Θ. D(θ) is the contour of Θ for given θB , which corresponds to C(z) = RB −Rs; Bob should
be within the curve C(z) = RB to guarantee a reliable transmission.
Substituting (8) into (9) and rearranging d and θ, Θ can be transformed into
Θ = {z = (d, θ) : d < D(θ)} conditioned on CB ≥ RB, (10)
where
D(θ) =
[
Pt|h˜|2
σ2n(2
RB−RS − 1)
] 1
β
. (11)
D(θ) is a function only of θ for a given θB and is the contour of Θ. All locations within D(θ)
have C(z) > RB − Rs, giving a clear geometric meaning, as shown in Fig. 2. It can be shown
from (11) that D(θ) (i.e., the shape of Θ) is mainly determined by |h˜|2. Thus, Θ is a dynamic
region with shifting boundary whenever |h˜|2 varies. When the channel is deterministic, D(θ) is
also deterministic.
It is worth noticing that in Fig. 2, Bob should be located inside the dashed line, i.e.,
CB ≥ RB. Since RB and Rs are system parameters that are constant, there is a fixed
relationship between the dashed line and D(θ). In this paper, the ER enclosed by D(θ) is
of more interest.
Denoted by A, the quantity of Θ can be measured by the inner area of D(θ). Using (11), A
in polar coordinates can be expressed by,
A =
1
2
∫ 2pi
0
D2(θ) dθ
=
1
2
[
Pt
σ2n(2
RB−RS − 1)
] 2
β
∫ 2pi
0
(|h˜|2) 2β dθ. (12)
A is measured in m2 and depends on |h˜|2 which can be a function of G(θ, θB) in the following.
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Lemma 1: |h˜|2 can be decomposed by
|h˜|2 = KG
2(θ, θB)
K + 1
+
g2Re + g
2
Im
K + 1
+
2
√
KG(θ, θB)
K + 1
gRe, (13)
where gRe and gIm are the real and imaginary part of a complex Gaussian random variable
g ∼ CN (0, 1). So, gRe and gIm are joint normal distributed variables, i.e., gRe, gIm ∼ N (0, 12).
Proof: In (5), let g be the following substitution.
g =
gT s∗(θB)√
N
(14)
sH(θB) is deterministic and each element of g is an i.i.d. complex Gaussian random variable
with zero mean and unit variance. Therefore, g is a complex Gaussian variable, g ∼ CN (0, 1).
Let gRe and gIm denote the real and imaginary part of g, where gRe and gIm are joint normal
variables, i.e., gRe, gIm ∼ N (0, 12). Thus,
h˜ =
√
K
K + 1
G(θ, θB) +
√
1
K + 1
gRe + j
√
1
K + 1
gIm. (15)
Then, |h˜|2 can be obtained by
|h˜|2 =
[√
K
K + 1
G(θ, θB) +
√
1
K + 1
gRe
]2
+
1
K + 1
g2Im
=
KG2(θ, θB)
K + 1
+
g2Re + g
2
Im
K + 1
+
2
√
KG(θ, θB)gRe
K + 1
. (16)
A reliable transmission is guaranteed for Bob, if Bob is inside the dashed curve in Fig. 2,
i.e., CB > RB. A secrecy outage event only occurs when zEi ∈ Θ. Intuitively, given that Bob’s
reliable transmission is guaranteed, the smaller A is, the smaller number of Eves are statistically
located in Θ, leading to less occurrence of the secrecy outage.
B. Spatial Secrecy Outage Probability
Any Eve at zEi ∈ Θ causes CEi > RB − Rs and this is referred to as a spatial secrecy
outage (SSO) event with respect to the ER. The spatial secrecy outage probability (SSOP) can
be defined by the probability that any Eve is located inside Θ. To the best of our knowledge, the
SSOP provides distinctive measure of the ER based security over the conventional SOP which
does not have dynamic geometric implication; the SSOP emphasizes the secrecy outage caused
by the spatially distributed Eves within a dynamic Θ.
September 22, 2016 DRAFT
Page 10 of 35IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
11
We quantify the SSOP, denoted by p, to measure the secrecy performance. Particularly for
given PPP-distributed Eves, the probability that m Eves are located inside Θ (with its area
quantity A) is given by
Prob{m Eves in Θ} = (λeA)
m
m!
e−λeA. (17)
Using (12) and (17), p can be quantitatively measured by referring to ‘no secrecy outage’ event
that no Eves are located inside Θ and is given by
p = 1− Prob{0 Eve in Θ} = 1− e−λeA. (18)
It can be seen from (18) that p decreases along with A and λe. The smaller p is, the more
secure transmission to Bob is. The physical meaning is that a smaller ER or less number
of potential Eves lead to less spatial secrecy outage occurrence.
Notice that p in (18) depends on the equivalent channel factor h˜ via A. Due to the fact that
h˜ is random channel fading, it is more interesting to study the expectation of p, which reflects
the averaged SSOP, which is denoted by p¯ and can be calculated by
p¯ = E|h˜|[p] = 1− E|h˜|[e−λeA]. (19)
Theorem 1: Given A in (12), p¯ in (19) can be expressed by
p¯ =

1−
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
{
− λe
2
c
2
β
0
∫ 2pi
0
[
KG2(θ, θB)
K + 1
+
x2 + y2
K + 1
+
2
√
KG(θ, θB)
K + 1
x
] 2
β
dθ
}
e−(x
2+y2)
pi
dx dy, K ∈ (0,∞) (20)
1− exp
{
− λe
2
c
2
β
0
∫ 2pi
0
[G2(θ, θB)]
2
β dθ
}
, K =∞ (21)
1−
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
{
− λepic
2
β
0 (x
2 + y2)
2
β
}
e−(x
2+y2)
pi
dx dy, K = 0, (22)
where λe is the density of Eves, c0 = Ptσ2n(2RB−RS−1) is deterministic, β is the path loss exponent, K
is the Rician factor, G(θ, θB) is the array factor when the DoE angle is Bob’s angle θB. G(θ, θB)
is a general array factor expression, based on which we can state that the definition of p¯
applies to any array type.
Proof: First, substituting c0 into (12), A can be simplified into
A =
1
2
∫ 2pi
0
(c0|h˜|2)
2
β dθ. (23)
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Substituting (13) and (23) into (19), p¯ can be calculated by
p¯ = EgRe,gIm [p] = 1−
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
{
− λe
2
c
2
β
0
∫ 2pi
0
[
KG2(θ, θB)
K + 1
+
x2 + y2
K + 1
+
2
√
KG(θ, θB)
K + 1
x
] 2
β
dθ
}
fgRe(x)fgIm(y) dx dy. (24)
For normal distribution,
fgRe(x) =
1√
pi
e−x
2
, (25)
fgIm(y) =
1√
pi
e−y
2
. (26)
(20) can be obtained by substituting (25) and (26) into (24). Take the limit of K → ∞ and
K → 0, (21) and (22) can be obtained, respectively. Thus, the proof is completed.
It is worth pointing out that for the deterministic channel (K →∞), p¯ in (21) is mainly decided
by G(θ, θB), while for the Rayleigh channel (K = 0), p¯ in (22) is shown not to contain G(θ, θB),
as there is no LOS component in Rayleigh fading channel. p¯ in Theorem 1 is complex and can be
numerically calculated. However, it is not tractable to obtain in closed-form expression, except
for the deterministic channel when β = 2. In the next subsection, upper bound expression for p¯
will be derived in closed-form to facilitate detailed theoretical analysis.
C. Upper Bound Expression for Averaged SSOP
To obtain the analytic upper bound expression, consider two major obstacles. First, let Xθ =
c0|h˜|2. A in (12) can be written in terms of Xθ as
A =
1
2
∫ 2pi
0
X
2
β
θ dθ. (27)
Xθ relies on the array factor G(θ, θB). It is not straightforward to solve the integral when β > 2.
The other obstacle is that Eh˜[e−λeA] in (19) is not mathematically tractable due to the composite
array factor and Rician fading channels.
To overcome the aforementioned obstacles, we aim to obtain the moments of |h˜|2. Denoted
by p¯up, the upper bound for p¯ can be obtained via the moments of |h˜|2 using two instances of
Jensen’s Inequality.
E[eX ] ≥ eE[X], (28)
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where X is a random variable. The equality holds if and only if X is a deterministic value. The
other one involved is expressed by
E[X
2
β ] ≤ (E[X]) 2β , (29)
where X is a random variable and β ≥ 2. The equality holds when β = 2 for any X .
Theorem 2: For given λe and K, p¯up can be derived using (28) and (29) and is expressed by
p¯up =

1− exp
{
− λepi
[
c0KA0 + 2c0pi
2pi(K + 1)
] 2
β
}
, K ∈ (0,∞) (30)
1− exp
[
− λepi
(
c0
2pi
A0
) 2
β
]
, K =∞ (31)
1− exp(−λepic
2
β
0 ), K = 0, (32)
where A0 denotes the pattern area and is given by,
A0 =
∫ 2pi
0
G2(θ, θB) dθ (33)
= 2pi + 4pi
N−1∑
n=1
N − n
N
J0(k∆dn) cos(k∆dn sin θB), (34)
where J0(x) is the Bessel function of the first kind with order zero, and k = 2pi/λ is a constant.
Proof: see Appendix A.
It is worth mentioning that A0 in (33) is a general expression to be applied to any type
of array (e.g., linear array, circular array). For the ULA, we can find approximations for
the expression of A0 in (34), because J0(x) has a decreasing envelope with the maximum
value J0(0) = 1 at x = 0, and approaches zero when x increases. This will facilitate the
analytical analysis for p¯up, which in turn provides guidance for the analysis of p¯, especially
if p¯up is close to p¯. Notice that for other array types, this method of analyzing p¯up to obtain
an insight of the properties of p¯ still works. If closed-form expressions, such as in (34),
do not exist, appropriate approximations or numerical results can be used based on the
particular form of given G(θ, θB).
Remark 2: Notice that the inequalities in (28) and (29) are used to derive p¯up. When K =∞
and β = 2, the equality holds for both (28) and (29); thus, p¯up = p¯. This can be verified by
substituting β = 2 into (21) and (31). Similarly, when K =∞, the equality holds only for (28);
thus, p¯up is tighter when β = 2 than that when β > 2 according to (29). When β = 2, the
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equality holds only for (29); thus, p¯up is tighter for K =∞ than that for K <∞ according to
(28). For other cases, the tightness of p¯up is not straightforward. The numerical results of p¯up
for different K and β will be given in Section VI-B.
Remark 3: Both p¯ in (20)-(22) and p¯up in (30)-(32) are positively correlated with the transmit
power Pt via c0. It is worth noticing that Pt influences the SSOP being independent of the
array parameters (N and θB). Therefore, in this paper, when studying the impact of the array
parameters, Pt is treated as constant within the constant c0.
V. IMPACT OF ULA PARAMETERS ON AVERAGED SSOP
The closed-form expression of A0 in (34) includes ULA parameters, i.e., N, θB,∆d. In
this paper, we take the commonly used setting ∆d = 0.5λ as an example and focus on
the impact of N and θB on A0 and thus the averaged SSOP p¯. The analyzing method is
the same for other values of ∆d, but the results will be different. First, we consider the
asymptotic case when K →∞ and N →∞. As stated in Remark 2, when K →∞ and β = 2,
we have p¯up = p¯. According to (21) and (31), it gives
p¯ = p¯up = 1− exp(−λec0
2
A0). (35)
As seen in (35), p¯up (i.e., p¯) monotonically increases with A0. Thus, it suffices to analyze the
behavior of A0. Detailed numerical results for p¯ and p¯up for generalized values of K and β will
be shown in Section VI-A.
A. Impact of θB
As stated in Remark 1, the range of θB ∈ [0, pi2 ] is concerned. First, let A0,n, for n = 1, ..., N−1,
denote the summation term in (34) and it is given by
A0,n = 4pi
N − n
N
J0(k∆dn) cos(k∆dn sin θB). (36)
When ∆d = 0.5λ, (36) can be written as
A0,n = 4pi
N − n
N
J0(npi) cos(npi sin θB). (37)
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Fig. 3. Behavior of J0(npi) and N−nN J0(npi) in A0,n for n ≤ N − 1 when N = 8 antenna elements are used. As n increases,
both terms become less significant in A0 (i.e., p¯up).
Using (34) and (37), A0 can be represented by
A0 = 2pi +
N−1∑
n=1
A0,n
= 2pi + 4pi
N−1∑
n=1
N − n
N
J0(npi) cos(npi sin θB) (38)
When N = 8 and ∆d = 0.5λ, the envelope of the components in (38) is shown in Fig. 3. In
the upper plot of Fig. 3, J0(npi) is shown to decrease as n. The lower plot depicts the decreasing
envelope of A0,n, i.e., N−nN J0(npi), with n. When n = 1, A0,1 is the largest; when n = 7, A0,7
is negligible.
As a result, for given N , we can approximate A0 by considering the first few dominant terms.
Especially in the case when ∆d = 0.5λ, A0,1 is dominant and it suffices to approximate A0
using only A0,1, i.e.,
A0 ≈ 2pi + 4piN − 1
N
J0(pi) cos(pi sin θB)
= 2pi +O(J0(pi) cos(pi sin θB)). (39)
Using (35) and (39), when K →∞, p¯up can be asymptotically approximated by
lim
K→∞
p¯up = 1− exp{−λec0pi −O(J0(pi) cos(pi sin θB))}, (40)
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Fig. 4. Impact of θB on A0,n and p¯up. Left plot: A0,n versus Bob’s angle θB . Right plot: exact value and approximations of
p¯up versus θBwhen N = 8, ∆d = 0.5λ. Pt/σ2n = 15 dB, RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz, Rs = 1 bps/Hz, λe = 1× 10−4
where O(·) denotes the big O notation.
From (39) and (40), it can be seen that for any given N , p¯up increases along with θB in the
range θB ∈ [0, pi/2], because cos(pi sin θB) decreases from 1 to −1 when θB increases from 0 to
pi
2
and J0(pi) < 0 as illustrated by the upper plot in Fig. 3. Physically, the main beam width
of the array pattern for a ULA with ∆d = 0.5λ increases with θB ∈ [0, pi/2], which leads
to an increase in A0 and thus p¯up and p¯.
Fig. 4 depicts the impact of θB on A0,n and p¯up. In particular, A0,n is the components of A0,
which p¯up relies on according to (35). For the illustrations, we use the ULA with N = 8 and
∆d = 0.5λ. In the left plot, A0,1 among A0,n, for n = {1, 2, 3}, has the largest variation from
θB = 0
◦ to θB = 90◦. The variation of A0,n in θB ∈ [0, pi/2] becomes smaller at larger n.
In the right plot of Fig. 4, the exact p¯up is shown in comparison to its various approximations:
when n = 1, the approximated p¯up in (40) is used, which relies on A0,1; when n = {1, 2}, the
approximated p¯up in (35) relies on A0,n in (38), and so forth. It can be seen in Fig. 4 that when
n = 1, the approximation already captures the increasing trend of the exact value. With more
values of A0,n, the approximation becomes closer to the exact value.
It is worth noticing from Fig. 4 that A0,n, for n > 2, is not monotonic in the range θB ∈ [0, pi2 ].
However, for n > 2, A0,n, is less dominant than A0,1. Overall, the exact value of p¯up is depicted
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Fig. 5. Behavior of qn versus for θB ∈ {0◦, 30◦, 60◦}.
to have a monotonic increasing relationship with θB in general.
B. Impact of N
When N changes, the number of summation terms in (38) as well as its own term envelope
|A0,n|, are also influenced. Therefore, we analyze A0 with respect to N for a given θB by
obtaining another approximation of A0. Let A0 in (38) have A0,n = 4piN−nN qn, where {qn} is an
series for given θB and n ∈ N+, i.e.,
qn = J0(k∆dn) cos(k∆dn sin θB). (41)
Examples of {qn} when ∆d = 0.5λ are illustrated in Fig. 5. For the three different values
of θB ∈ {0◦, 30◦, 60◦}, it can be seen in Fig. 5 that the behavior of {qn} differs greatly. When
θB = 0
◦, qn = J0(npi) are discrete samples of J0(x). When θB = 30◦, qn = J0(npi) cos(npi2 ) is
zero for odd n; and (−1)n/2J0(x) for even n. When θB = 60◦, qn = J0(npi) cos(n
√
3pi
2
).
When N is sufficiently large, N−n
N
becomes negligible for larger n; qn also approaches zero
as n increases, as illustrated in Fig. 5. In this case, only A0,n, for n ≤ Nup ≤ N − 1 needs to be
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Fig. 6. p¯up versus N for Bob’s angle θB ∈ {0◦, 30◦, 60◦}. ∆d = 0.5λ, Pt/σ2n = 15 dB, RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz, Rs = 1 bps/Hz,
λe = 1× 10−4
considered. Thus, the asymptotic expression when N →∞ can be expressed by
lim
N→∞
A0 ≈ 2pi + 4pi
Nup∑
n=1
N − n
N
qn
= 2pi + 4pi
Nup∑
n=1
qn. (42)
The particular value of Nup, larger than which qn is negligible, is subject to practical requirement.
According to (42), we can asymptotically have
lim
N→∞
p¯up ≈ 1− exp{−λec0
2
(2pi + 4pi
Nup∑
n=1
qn)}, (43)
where |qn|  1 for n > Nup.
Fig. 6 depicts the impact of N on p¯up for various θB ∈ {0◦, 30◦, 60◦}. It can be seen from this
figure that when N increases, p¯up fluctuates at different rate for different θB. In addition, it can
be observed that for any θB, p¯up approaches to a fixed value when N grows sufficiently large.
This validates the asymptotic expression in (42).
VI. SIMULATIONS AND NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulations and numerical results for p¯ and p¯up of the ER based
beamforming over the Rician channel with any K ≥ 0 and β = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6} with respect to N
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Fig. 7. p¯up for different values of A0, K and β. Pt/σ2n = 40 dB, RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz, Rs = 1 bps/Hz, λe = 1× 10−4
and θB.
A. SSOP and Its Upper Bound
In (30), p¯up is positively correlated with
[
c0K
2pi(K+1)
A0+
c0
K+1
] 2
β
. For any fixed β and K, p¯up also
has a positive relationship with A0. Thus, the conclusions that are reached about A0 regarding
to the impact of N and θB also apply to p¯up for different β and K.
For convenience, let A1 denote c0K2pi(K+1)A0+
c0
K+1
. When β increases from 2 to 6, A
2
β
1 decreases,
because A1 is generally larger than 1. It is also noticed that when A0 = 2pi, K factor disappears,
i.e., A1 = c0. When A0 < 2pi, the larger K is, the smaller A1 (i.e., p¯up) is; when A0 > 2pi, the
larger K is, the larger A1 (i.e., p¯up) is.
In Fig. 7, the examples of p¯up for different K and β are given for three typical values of A0,
i.e., 4.1326, 2pi and 15.3761, which corresponds to θB = 0◦, 48.35◦ and 90◦ when N = 8. The
logarithm scale is used to clearly show the ranges of p¯up and K. It can be seen that, when β
increases, p¯up drops. For fixed β, p¯up increases, stays unchanged or decreases depending on the
value of A0.
The range of K in linear scale is from 0.01 to 50. When K = 0.01, the Rician channel
approaches the Rayleigh channel (K = 0). When K = 50, the Rician channel approaches the
deterministic channel (K =∞). It can be seen that for fixed β, p¯up is a constant for K = 0 and
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Fig. 8. Simulation and numerical results for p¯ versus θB ; K = 10, β = 3, Pt/σ2n = 15 dB, RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz,
Rs = 1 bps/Hz, λe = 1× 10−4
is irrelevant to A0 (nor N , θB), as shown in (22) and (32). When K > 10, p¯up approaches to a
certain value that depends on A0 which in turn depends on N and θB.
The above analysis of the properties of p¯up serves as a coarse guidance for that of p. In the
following, precise numerical results are used to show the properties of p¯, which cannot be easily
analyzed according to (20). First, the simulation results are provided to validate the expressions
of p¯ in (20) to (22) which are derived from the expression in (19) which contains Gaussian
random variables via |h˜2| according to (12) and (13).
We choose K = 10 and β = 3 as an example to compare the numerical results based on the
expression in (20) and the simulation results based on the expression in (19). For the simulations,
1 × 104 samples are generated for gRe and gIm in (13). The simulation and numerical results
plotted in Fig. 8 show a good match between them, which verifies the validity of the expressions
in (20) to (22).
An example of p¯ versus θB for β = 3 and N = 8 is given in Fig. 9. β = 3 is a typical value
for some indoor scenarios such as home and factory [35]. Typical values of K are chosen as 0,
1, 10 and ∞. In addition, p¯up is also shown.
It can be seen that p¯ and p¯up increase in the range θB ∈ [0, pi2 ], except for K = 0. When
K = 0, the curves are flat because p¯ and p¯up are irrelevant to θB, according to (22) and (32).
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Fig. 9. p¯ and p¯up versus Bob’s angle θB for different K when β = 3, N = 8, ∆d = 0.5λ. Pt/σ2n = 15 dB, RB =
3.4594 bps/Hz, Rs = 1 bps/Hz, λe = 1× 10−4
By comparing p¯up and p¯, it can be observed that the upper bound reflects the trend very well.
It can also be seen that for both p¯ and p¯up, the curve for K = 10 is closer to that for K =∞,
while the curve for K = 1 is closer to that for K = 0.
For completeness, Fig. 10 shows an example of p¯ and p¯up versus N for β = 3 and θB = 0◦. It
can be seen that p¯ and p¯up decrease to different floor levels depending on K. The same behavior
has been shown in Fig. 6 where K =∞ and β = 2. However, it can also be seen that p¯ converges
with a much slower speed, leading to an increasing larger gap between p¯ and p¯up as N increases.
In summary, the properties of A0 with respect to N and θB can be extended to p¯up. As for
p¯, while p¯ has similar properties to A0 with respect to N and θB, the gaps between p¯ and p¯up
increase as N . Therefore, in the next section, the tightness of p¯up will be examined.
B. Tightness of Upper Bound
In this section, the tightness of the upper bound is examined via numerical results with respect
to (K, β,N, θB). An example of p¯ and p¯up for different K and β with N = 8 and θB = 0◦ is
shown in Fig. 11. At lower region of K, the channel approaches the Rayleigh channel. Thus,
p¯ and p¯up converge to the certain values that only depend on β according to (22) and (32). At
higher region of K, the channel approaches the deterministic channel. p¯ and p¯up converge to the
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Fig. 10. p¯ and p¯up versus number of elements N for different K when β = 3, θB = 0◦, ∆d = 0.5λ. Pt/σ2n = 15 dB,
RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz, Rs = 1 bps/Hz, λe = 1× 10−4
certain values that depend on β and G(θ, θB), according to (21) and (31).
It can also be seen that when β = 2, the curves for p¯ and p¯up emerge as K increases, which
corresponds to p¯ = p¯up for the deterministic channel. For other values of β, as K increases, the
gaps between p¯ and p¯up increases.
In this section, the ratio between p¯up and p¯ is used to measure the tightness of p¯up. Let η
denote the ratio,
η =
p¯up
p¯
. (44)
η ≥ 1. The smaller value of η, the tighter p¯up is. In Fig. 11, it can be deduced that η will take the
minimum value at K = 0 and approach the maximum value at K =∞. Thus, in the following,
the extreme cases K = 0 and K =∞ are used to study the range of η for different N , θB and
β.
In Fig. 12, η is plotted against θB for K = 0 and K = ∞ for all β. The ULA has N = 8
elements and ∆d = 0.5λ. For Rayleigh channel, both p¯ and p¯up are irrelevant to θB, thus η is
flat across θB ∈ [0, 90◦]. For the deterministic channel when β = 2, η = 1; when β > 2, η in
general decrease with θB.
Comparing the curves for both the deterministic and the Rayleigh channels, it is noticed that
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Fig. 11. p¯ and p¯up for different K and β when N = 8, θB = 0◦, ∆d = 0.5λ. Pt/σ2n = 15 dB, RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz,
Rs = 1 bps/Hz, λe = 1× 10−4
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Fig. 12. η versus Bob’s angle θB for deterministic and Rayleigh channels for all β, number of elements is N = 8
when β > 2, the ratios are located closely in a cluster. However, there does not exist monotonic
relationship between η and β. For example, when β = 6, η for the deterministic channel is
smaller than that when β = 4.
In Fig. 13, η is plotted against N for K = {0,∞} and β ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. The ULA has
∆d = 0.5λ and θB = 0◦. For the Rayleigh channel, η is flat across N for all β. For the
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Fig. 13. η versus N for deterministic and Rayleigh channels for all β, θB = 0◦
deterministic channel, η in general increases with N when β > 2, which verifies the observation
from Fig. 10.
In summary, when β = 2, η decreases with K till the minimum value η = 1; when β > 2, η
increases with K till certain value that depends on N and θB, and the values of η for different
β stay in a cluster. For given β and K, η generally decreases with θB and increases with N . In
a lower region of N , e.g., N < 10, the value of η is smaller than 2.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has investigated secure wireless communications whereby a ULA in Alice commu-
nicates to Bob in the presence of PPP distributed Eves. Particularly, we mathematically defined
ER to characterize spatial secrecy outage event and proposed the ER based beamforming over a
Rician fading channel. As for the analysis of the ER, the analytic expression of the pattern area
was also derived in form of Bessel function and two different approximations were adopted to
analyze how the Bobs angle and the number of element of the ULA quantify the ER. Using the
ER, the SSOP was defined and the SSOP performance was evaluated, allowing the derivation of
its exact and upper bound closed-form expressions. The impact of the array parameters on the
SSOP was discussed to find that the SSOP increases dramatically with increasing Bobs angle;
decreases with reducing ER; and approaches certain level with increasing number of antenna
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elements. Simulations and the numerical results validated our analysis and examined the tightness
of the upper bound expressions. Since the definitions of the ER and the SSOP were generalized
to be applicable to any array type, the results can be useful to various antenna array types in
future wireless security systems. In this work, we assumed that Eves are non-collaborative.
For future work, collaboration between Eves could be investigated.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
According to (19) and (28), it can be derived that
p¯ = 1− E|h˜|[e−λeA] ≤ 1− e−λeE|h˜|[A]. (45)
Notice that A depends on random variable h˜ and is not constant, except for K =∞. Thus, the
equality holds only for deterministic channels.
To solve (45), assume that θ ∼ U(0, 2pi). According to (27), A in (45) can be converted into
A = 2pi
1
2
∫ 2pi
0
1
2pi
X
2
β
θ dθ = piEθ[X
2
β
θ ]. (46)
According to (29), (46) is bounded by
A ≤ pi(Eθ[Xθ])
2
β = pi
(∫ 2pi
0
1
2pi
Xθ dθ
) 2
β
. (47)
In the inequality, the equality holds when β = 2 for any K.
According to (45) and (47), it can be derived that
E|h˜|[A] ≤ piE|h˜|
[(∫ 2pi
0
1
2pi
Xθ dθ
) 2
β
]
. (48)
Then applying (29) and (48), it can be derived that
piE|h˜|
[(∫ 2pi
0
1
2pi
Xθ dθ
) 2
β
]
≤ pi
(
E|h˜|
[ ∫ 2pi
0
1
2pi
Xθ dθ
]) 2
β
. (49)
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Exchanging the integral and E|h˜|, then substituting Xθ = c0|h˜|2, it can be derived that
E|h˜|[A] ≤ pi
(
c0
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
E|h˜|[|h˜|2] dθ
) 2
β
. (50)
Notice that when β = 2, the equality holds.
Apply (50) to (45) then obtain
p¯ ≤ 1− e−λeE|h˜|[A]
≤ 1− exp
[
− λepi
(
c0
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
E|h˜|[|h˜|2] dθ
) 2
β
]
. (51)
The upper bound p¯up can be expressed by
p¯up = 1− exp
[
− λepi
(
c0
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
E|h˜|[|h˜|2] dθ
) 2
β
]
. (52)
According to (13), E|h˜|[|h˜|2] = KG
2(θ,θB)+1
K+1
. Substituting the previous result into (52), (30) can
be obtained.
For special cases, take the limit of K →∞ and K → 0, (21) and (22) can be obtained.
For the ULA, (33) can be further derived according to (6).
A0 =
∫ 2pi
0
1
N
∑
i,j
ejk∆d(sin θB−sin θ)(i−j) dθ
=
1
N
∑
i,j
ejk∆d sin θB(i−j)
∫ 2pi
0
e−jk∆d sin θ(i−j)dθ. (53)
According to the integral representation of the Bessel function of the first kind, Jn(x) =
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi e
j(nτ−x sin τ)dτ , (53) can be further derived by
A0 =
2pi
N
∑
i,j
J0(k∆d(i− j))ejk∆d(i−j) sin θB , (54)
where A0 is the summation of N ×N terms. To further simplify (54), each of which is denoted
by A0,i,j ,
A0,i,j =
2pi
N
J0(k∆d(i− j))ejk∆d(i−j) sin θB . (55)
Notice that the only variable across all A0,i,j is the difference i− j. So let n = i− j and it can
be derived that
A0,n =
2pi
N
J0(k∆dn)e
jk∆dn sin θB . (56)
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Fig. 14. Table for A0,i,j shows the symmetry regarding to the diagonal line i = j
Then, all the values of n that are associated with A0,n are mapped into a table shown in Fig. 14.
Observing the table in Fig. 14, it is noticed that i) the terms of A0,n on the diagonal lines can
be combined, because they are the same; ii) becuase Jm(−x) = (−1)mJm(x), the terms of A0,n
that have the same absolute value of n can be added
A0,n + A0,−n
=
2pi
N
[J0(k∆dn)e
jk∆dn sin θB + J0(−k∆dn)e−jk∆dn sin θB ]
=
4pi
N
J0(k∆dn) cos(k∆dn sin θB). (57)
In addition, when n = 0, J0(0) = 1 and ej0 = 1. Thus, A0,0 = 2piN . Now, sum up the terms of
A0,n on each diagonal lines from n = 0 to p = N − 1 and obtain
A0 = 2pi + 4pi
N−1∑
n=1
N − n
N
J0(k∆dn) cos(k∆dn sin θB). (58)
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RESPONSES TO REVIEWER 1
We would like to thank the reviewer for the constructive comments which helped us to improve the quality and
better present our work. The following are the changes according to each comment.
1) “From the theoretical and numerical results, the authors claim that the SSOP increases dramatically
as Bob’s angle increases. I suggest the authors present some physical insight illustrations about the
conclusion.”
Physically, because of the fact that the main beam width of the array factor G(θ, θB) increases as θB diverges
away from the norm direction of the ULA, the integral of G2(θ, θB) over θ ∈ [0, 2pi] in (20-22), and the
array pattern area, i.e., A0 =
∫ 2pi
0
G2(θ, θB) dθ in (33), increase with θB ∈ [0, pi/2] for a ULA with half-
wavelength spacing. Therefore, p¯ increases with Bob’s angle. The physical explanation has been now added
in the paragraph after (40) in Section V-A.
2) “The access point Alice is located at the origin point, then how to place ULA is not explained in the
system model.”
The ULA is put along Y-axis with the center at the origin point. The benefit of this set-up is that the angle
of a user in the polor coordinates equals to the angle between the user and the norm direction of the ULA.
The 2nd paragraph in Section III has been revised accordingly.
3) “In the title, SSOP is abbreviated to spatial security outage probability, while to spatial secrecy outage
probability in the article, I think they should be unified.”
It has now been changed to ‘spatial secrecy outage probability’ in the title.
4) “There are some typos appear in this paper:
In Line 9, Page 5, close-form should be closed-form.
In Line 14, Page 7, there are two commas.
In Line 16, Page 13, there are some messy codes.
In Line 36, Page 18, there should be a space between . and For.
In Figure 11, average should be Average in the Y-coordinate.
The Appendix Part is usually placed ahead of the Reference Part.”
All the typos have been corrected and the appendix has been moved ahead of the references.
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RESPONSES TO REVIEWER 2
We would like to thank the reviewer for the valuable comments which helped us to improve the quality of our
work. Each comment has been responded with appropriate updates in the revised manuscript.
1) “Some assumptions on the system model are not clarified. For example, does the transmitter (Alice)
know the instantaneous channel state information of the channel from Alice to Bob?
If not, the adopted transmitted vector u is ok. However, the definition of exposure region in (8) has
to be clarified. If not, the main channel capacity CB is also a random variable, which has to be
considered in the definition of ER. As such, (10) has to be double checked.
If yes, the adopted transmitted vector u is not optimal in terms of maximizing the SNR at Bob and
beamforming should be adopted as the beamformer.”
In this paper, we consider Bob’s location information is known instead of the channel state information. This
assumption is also used in references [13-15], two of which have been recommended by the reviewer in
comment 6). Under this assumption, the beamforming weights are set according to Bob’s angle. Since there
is no availability of Bob’s channel state information, the adopted beamforming weights are not optimal in
terms of maximizing the SNR at Bob.
As for the definition of ER, please refer to the 1st paragraph in Section IV-A. Particularly, as in [34], a
secrecy outage and a unreliable transmission (i.e., data outage) are differentiated. We focus only on the
secrecy outage event, given that CB ≥ RB . Notice that the data outage event, given that CB < RB , is the
typical data outage leading to no secrecy and thus no secrecy outage. Accordingly, this data outage is not
part of the secrecy outage and is out of our scope. Instead, given that CB ≥ RB and for only the secrecy
outage event, the ER in (8) ((9) in the revised manuscript) can be defined by the geometric region zEi only
where CEi > RB −Rs. Thus, (10) ((11) in the revised manuscript) is the ER, conditioned on CB ≥ RB .
The clarifications have been added in the 4th paragraph in Section I and the 1st paragraph in Section IV-A.
2) “Why are single-antenna Bob and single-antenna Eve considered hile multiple antennas are consid-
ered at Alice?”
We consider Wi-Fi as our application case. In this context, it is common that an AP has multiple antennas
and mobile devices have a single antenna, due to limited physical space. This clarification has been added
in the 1st paragraph in Section III.
3) “Do the multiple Eves cooperate with each other to decode the information transmitted by Alice? If
they can, the type of combining technology at these Eves should be clarified.”
Thank you for pointing it out. In this paper, we do not consider collaborative Eves. However, it is a good
idea for future work. The clarification has been added in the 1st paragraph in Section III and in Section VII.
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4) “In the abstract, the authors claimed that the proposed approach may be applied to any type of
antenna array. Could the author provide any support for this claim? In this work, the authors only
focused on the uniform linear array and did not provide any discussions in light of the extension to
general antenna arrays.”
Yes, in this paper, we claim that the approach of analyzing the SSOP is generally applicable to any type
of array, i.e., substituting the particular expression of any given array factor G(θ, θB) into p¯ and p¯up and
performing analytical or numerical analysis. Particularly, we have now generalized the expression of G(θ, θB)
in (1) for either uniform linear array or uniform circular array. An example for the uniform circular array
has been now provided below (2). In addition, more clarification has been made in Theorem 1 on page 11
and in the paragraph after the proof of Theorem 2 on page 13.
5) “Page 13, line 16, 9999dd, typos?”
It has been corrected.
6) “Some closed related works are not discussed in the Related Work section. Two of them are listed as
follows.
[1] S. Yan and R. Malaney, ‘Location-based beamforming for enhancing secrecy in Rician wiretap
channels,’ IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 2780-2791, Apr. 2016.
[2] C. Liu and R. Malaney, ‘Location-based beamforming for Rician wiretap channels,’ in Proc.
AusCTW, Jan. 2016, pp. 124-129.”
Thank you for this comment. The two references have been added in the reference list as [13] and [15].
They now appear in the 2nd and 4th paragraphs of Section I and in the last paragraph of Section II.
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RESPONSES TO REVIEWER 3
We would like to thank the reviewer for the helpful comments that make our work of better quality. Please refer
to our responses to each comment.
1) “The reason of setting the beamforming vector to be s(θB), i.e., the steering vector towards Bob’s
direction, should be better justified. Why wouldn’t the transmitter use other kinds of commonly used
beamformers, such as MRT?”
In this paper, we consider Bob’s location information is known instead of the channel state information.
This assumption is also used in references [13-15]. Under this assumption, we adopt a simple beamforming
vector according to Bob’s angle, while the MRT under Bob’s full channel state information is more complex
than ours. The clarification has been updated in the 4th paragraph in Section I.
2) “In the system model, the inter-antenna spacing is set to be λ/2. Is it necessary for the subsequent
analysis? Can the results be extended to general cases with arbitrary antenna spacing?”
The array steering vector for the ULA in (2) and the array factor G(θ, θB) in (6) have been now generalized
for any ∆d. So are the SSOP related expressions. Note that in (34), A0 has been generalized for any ∆d.
In Section V, ∆d = λ/2 is chosen as an example for further analysis. The clarifications have been provided
in the first paragraph in Section V.
3) “It is required that Bob should be located inside the dashed line in Fig. 2. However, this dashed
line-region is less discussed in the manuscript. This region is also dynamic (non-deterministic) which
is similar to the ER. How to guarantee that Bob is located inside of this region? If this cannot be
guaranteed, the probability that Bob is located outside of this region should be addressed in the outage
analysis.”
We believe this is about a differentiation between secrecy outage and data outage. Basically, the dashed-line
region implies a boundary between Bob’s data outage region (CB < RB) and Bob’s secrecy outage region
(CB ≥ RB and CEi > RB − Rs). In this work, the former leads to a unreliable transmission event (i.e.,
CB < RB) which is typically referred to as the outage event. In such data outage event, there is no secrecy
and thus, no secrecy outage (e.g., see [34]). For example, the probability that Bob is located outside of this
dashed-line region is reduced to the typical data outage probability and thus it is not part of the secrecy outage
probability. Therefore, only given that CB ≥ RB , we focus more on the secrecy outage. The clarification
has been added in the 1st and 4th paragraphs of Section IV-A.
4) “Discussion on that how the performance would change with different Eve’s density can be interesting.”
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As shown in equation (18) and (20-22), the SSOP increases with λe. Also, the impact of λe on the SSOP is
independent with the array parameters. The sentences under equation (18) in Section IV-B have been now
updated.
5) “Typos:
a) In Remark 1: ‘ULA,,’
b) Below Remark 3: ‘9999dd’ ”
The typos have been corrected.
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